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Digest: Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines Partnership 
Benjamin Price 
Opinion by Chin, J., with George, C.J., Baxter, J., and Corrigan, J. 
Dissenting Opinion by Werdegar, J. Dissenting Opinion by Moreno, J., 
with Kennard, J. and Werdegar, J. 
Issue 
Are nonemployer individuals personally liable for their role in 
retaliation for which the employer is liable under the Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) 1? 
Facts 
Plaintiff Scott Jones sued his employer, The Lodge at Torrey Pines 
Partnership (the Lodge), and several others, including his supervisor, for 
various causes of action under the FEHA, including sexual orientation 
harassment in violation of California Government Code section 
12940(j)(l ), sexual orientation discrimination in violation of Section 
12940(a), and retaliation in violation of Section 12940(h).2 The trial court 
granted summary adjudication for defendant on the harassment cause of 
action.3 The discrimination claim against the Lodge and the retaliation 
claim against the Lodge and the supervisor went to the jury, which found 
for the plaintiff on both.4 However, the trial court granted the defendant's 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that non-
employer individuals cannot be personally liable for retaliation under the 
FEHA.5 The court of appeal reversed and reinstated the jury verdict.6 The 
California Supreme Court granted review to determine "whether an 
individual may be held personally liable for retaliation under the FEHA."7 
Analysis 
The retaliation subdivision ofthe FEHA provides that it is an unlawful 
employment practice to discriminate against a person for opposing 
1 CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 12900-12996 (West 2008). 
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practices prohibited under the act. 8 In Reno v. Baird, the Court held that, 
under the discrimination provision of the FEHA9, individual employees 
may not be held liable for unlawful discrimination. 10 The plaintiff in Jones, 
however, argued that the different language in subdivision (h) warranted a 
different rule. 11 Subdivision (a) makes it an unlawful employment practice 
for "an employer" to discriminate, while subdivision (h) makes it unlawful 
for an "employer, labor organization, employment agency, or person" to 
retaliate. 12 The plaintiff argued that, because subdivision (h) contains the 
word "person," while subdivision (a) does not, the plain language indicates 
that individual employees may be personally liable for retaliation. 13 
The Court found that more than one interpretation of subdivision (h) 
was possible. 14 The statutory language, the Court said, was much less clear 
than subdivision (j), which explicitly makes an "employee" subject to 
personal liability for harassment. 15 The FEHA undercuts the difference 
between subsections (a) and (h) by defining "employer" under both as "any 
person acting as an agent of an employer .... " 16 In Reno, however, the 
Court said that this definition was intended only to ensure that employers 
would be liable for discrimination by their agents. 17 Similarly, the Court 
here stated that the Legislature may not have intended the word "person" in 
subdivision (h) to make individuals personally liable for retaliation. 18 
The Court also relied on Reno's rationale for distinguishing between 
harassment, for which individuals may be held personally liable, and 
discrimination, for which they may not. 19 Harassment claims, the Court in 
Reno stated, arise from conduct that may be avoided because it is guided by 
personal motives, while discrimination claims arise from conduct that 
cannot be avoided because it is within the necessary scope of one's job 
performance.20 In addition, the FEHA exempts small employers from 
liability for discrimination, but not harassment.21 Therefore, the Court said, 
it would be "incongruous" to hold individual non-employers liable for 
discrimination.22 This result would also create a conflict of interest, the 
Court stated, because the employee would choose the course of action least 
likely to lead to a discrimination suit against her rather than choosing the 
8 CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 12940(h). 
9 § 12940(a). 
10 Jones, 177 P.3d at 235 (citing Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998)). 
II fd. 
12 ld. (quoting CAL. Gov. CODE§§ 12940(a), (h)) (emphasis added). 
13 ld. (quoting CAL. Gov. CODE§ 12940(h)). 
14 ld. 
15 ld. (quoting CAL. Gov. CODE§ 12940(j)(3)). 
16 ld. (quoting CAL. Gov. CODE§ 12926(d)). 
17 ld. at 235-36 (citing Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333 (1998)). 
18 !d. at 236. 
19 !d. (citing Reno, 957 P.2d at 1333). 
20 !d. at 236-37 (citing Reno, 957 P.2d at 1333). 
21 !d. at 237. 
22 !d. at 239. 
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best course of action for her employer.23 Finally, the Court found that 
imposing liability on individuals would add little to enhance the prospect of 
the victim's recovery because assessing individual blame for discrimination 
is harder, when decisions are often made collectively, than assigning blame 
on the entity as a whole.24 The Court concluded that all of these reasons for 
exemption to non-employer individuals for personal liability in 
discrimination claims apply equally to retaliation claims. 25 
The Court also found the absence of legislative history behind the 
inclusion of the word "person" in subdivision (h) significant.26 The Court 
explained that the Legislature intended the amendment, which added the 
word "person to subdivision (h), only as a "technical and conforming 
change" to the FEHA. 27 Further, the Court stated, this amendment 
encountered little opposition during the legislative process.28 The Court 
reiterated the Court of Appeal's observation that "[i]t is difficult to imagine 
that legislation that would have [created individual liability for retaliation 
where none had existed] could properly be characterized as 
noncontroversial. "29 The Court also stated that it was "highly unlikely that 
the Legislature would make such a significant change in the [potential 
liability of individuals] without so much as a passing reference to what it 
was doing. "30 
Holding 
The Court held that, while employers continue to be subject to liability 
for retaliation under the FEHA, non-employer individuals may not be 
subject to personal liability for their role in that retaliationY 
Dissent 
Justice Werdegar argued that the plain meaning of Section 12940(h) is 
to hold any person who retaliates liable for that action. 32 The majority's 
opinion, he said, undermined the purpose of the FEHA. 33 Furthermore, he 
said, it is not for the Court to say "[ w ]hether personal liability in these 
circumstances is more or less efficacious in reducing or eliminating 
workplace discrimination .... "34 
23 !d. at 238. 
24 !d. 
25 !d. at 238-39. 
26 !d. at 240. 
27 !d. 
2H !d. at 241. 
29 !d. (internal quotations omitted). 
30 !d. 
31 !d. at 243. 
32 Id at 244. 
33 !d. 
34 !d. 
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Dissent 
Justice Moreno argued that, because Section 12940(h) includes the 
word "person", the meaning is clear and the inquiry should end.35 
Evaluating the wisdom of imposing personal liability on individuals who 
retaliate, he said, is for the legislature to decide, not the courts.36 The 
majority's decision, he said, allows an individual who commits harassment 
under Section 12940(j) to be subject to personal liability for that 
harassment, but not for retaliation intended to discourage attempts to report 
such harassment. 37 This, he said, creates an incentive for the person who 
committed the harassment to retaliate. 38 He said that the Legislature could 
not have intended such a "perverse and irrational result."39 
Justice Moreno also argued that Reno was distinguishable because the 
retaliation subdivision significantly adds "person," whereas the 
discrimination subdivision does not.4° Furthermore, he said, in Reno the 
Court found that the term, "employer" in the discrimination subdivision 
incorporated respondeat superior principles. 41 However, the retaliation 
subdivision uses both the terms, "employer" and "person."42 It would be 
incorrect, he said, to argue that the word "person" also incorporates 
respondeat superior principles when the term, "employer" clearly does so.43 
Legal Significance 
As a result of this decision, non-employer individuals in the workplace 
may stand confident that they will not be personally liable for their role in 
retaliation under the FEHA. Given the court's recognition that retaliation 
claims are closer in similarity to discrimination claims under the FEHA, 
non-employer individuals will not be subjected to personal liability for 
claims arising from workplace retaliation. 
However, employers remain subject to personal liability for claims of 
retaliation and both employers and non-employers may be subject to 
personal liability for claims of harassment under the FEHA. 
35 ld. at 244-45. 




40 !d. at 250. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. 
43 !d. 
